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INTRODUCTION
“A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”1
Scholars now understand Justice Holmes’s quote as one of inclusion
rather than exclusion, for which it was originally meant.2 Indeed, it
is well settled that at times a state law claim “arises under” federal
law such that federal question jurisdiction is proper.3 But underly-
ing Holmes’s comment is a widely held concern that exercising
federal question jurisdiction over a state law claim turning on
federal issues could invite a plethora of state filings into federal
court.4 In recent years, the Supreme Court has made efforts to
clarify the doctrine and in the process trimmed back the instances
in which a federal court should usurp authority over a state law
claim.
Imagine a situation in which the individual plaintiff’s sole theory
of liability turns on federal law. Further suppose that one of the
required elements of the plaintiff’s claim is that she prove this
federal violation. Plaintiffs confront this very situation when
alleging malpractice against attorneys who handled their federal
claims. For these plaintiffs, the federal issue is unavoidable.
Malpractice, however, is a traditional state law claim.5 An aggrieved
client may now wonder whether she can bring her malpractice claim
in the federal court that could have heard the underlying action or
whether she must file in state court.
Yet the door to the federal courthouse is not so easily opened. The
presence of a federal issue alone is insubstantial; the claim itself
must “arise under” federal law.6 Not surprisingly, the Supreme
Court’s most important decisions interpreting “arising under” occur
in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question
jurisdiction statute.7 But the phrase appears in other jurisdictional
1. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
2. MARTIN H.REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 69 (1980).
3. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
4. Id. at 318. 
5. Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 2008).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
7. See infra Part II.A.
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statutes as well, namely § 1338, which applies to patents, copy-
rights, and trademarks.8 The phrase’s meaning is the same in both
statutes.9 Section 1338(a), however, throws a wrench in the works.
Section 1338(a) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts
for patent cases.10 Should federal courts treat a patent-based
malpractice suit as a patent case, governed exclusively by federal
law, or as a state law professional negligence claim? 
Two Supreme Court cases shed light on this problem. In Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,11 the Court failed to find
federal question jurisdiction over a state law claim that relied on
the violation of a federal statute as negligence per se.12 Conversely,
in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing,13 the Court held that federal jurisdiction was proper
over a state quiet title claim.14 Read together these cases confirm
that the Court sees the embedded federal question as a rare
exception to the general rule of federal question jurisdiction. Courts
should be reluctant to allow garden-variety state law claims into
federal court even if they necessarily require a plaintiff to raise
federal issues. The opposite result would be antithetical to the
federalism concerns underlying the Court’s federal question
jurisprudence. Indeed, when there is no significant federal interest
at stake, these federalism concerns counsel in favor of remand.
This Note argues that this skepticism against allowing a state
claim into federal court should extend to an overwhelming majority
of patent-based malpractice claims, despite the statutory grant of
exclusive jurisdiction for patent cases. Part I will briefly explain
patent-based malpractice and the peculiar problem of the “suit
within a suit” requirement for causation analysis. Part II will then
discuss relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence on “arising under”
jurisprudence, the embedded federal question, and patent jurisdic-
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
9. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988). In Christianson,
the Court held that “[l]inguistic consistency” demanded that courts give “arising under” the
same meaning in both statutes. Id. at 808-09. Functionally, this requires courts to apply §
1331 precedents in § 1338(a) cases.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 
11. 478 U.S. 804 (1988).
12. Id. at 807.
13. 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
14. Id. at 314. 
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tion. Part III will highlight recent decisions by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) allowing patent-
based malpractice claims in federal court, as well as state court and
Fifth Circuit decisions reaching the opposite conclusion. Part IV
will apply the Court’s current understanding of “arising under” to
patent-based malpractice claims and argue that patent-based
malpractice claims should rarely qualify for federal question
jurisdiction.15
I. MALPRACTICE AND PATENT ATTORNEYS
In the last forty years, the number of malpractice claims has
steadily increased.16 However, until recently, patent-based malprac-
tice claims were quite rare.17 Whatever the cause,18 aggrieved clients
are bringing more claims against patent attorneys.19 Considering
the high stakes in patent litigation, it is natural for clients to
15. For purposes of simplicity, the remainder of the Note will refer to federal question
jurisdiction as federal jurisdiction, recognizing that diversity and supplemental jurisdiction
are also effective avenues for patentees to file their malpractice claims in federal court.
16. 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 1:6, at 21-22 fig.1
(2009). Indeed, Mallen and Smith set forth alternating explanations as to the cause of the rise
in malpractice litigation. Id. at 23-30. The bottom line is that more aggrieved clients are
finding their way to a courthouse. 
17. 3 id. § 24:24, at 664.
18. As Professor Oddi points out, there are several likely reasons for the increase in
patent-based malpractice claims. A. Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice: An Oxymoron
No More, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 4. First, patents have become increasingly
valuable over the years, and, especially since the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the
courts have displayed an attitude toward heightened enforcement and liberally granting
damages to aggrieved patentees. Id. at 6-7. Correspondingly, the costs of patent litigation
have steadily increased over the last decade. Id. at 7 n.33. Professor Oddi’s summation is that
the “high costs of patent acquisition and litigation” have likely raised clients’ expectations;
when those expectations are not met, clients seem to be more willing to attempt recovery
through a malpractice action. Id. at 7. Oddi points to the AIPLA’s Report of the Economic
Survey for 2003, which reported median patent litigation costs from five hundred thousand
dollars to four million dollars, depending on the value of the patent. Id. at 7 n.33. The 2007
report showed that for patent infringement suits worth less than one million dollars, the
median inclusive litigation costs rose to six hundred thousand dollars, while the median
inclusive litigation costs of patent infringement suits worth more than twenty-five million
dollars rose to five million dollars. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N LAW PRACTICE MGMT.
COMM., AIPLA REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 25-26 (2007). 
19. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2004-2007, at 4 tbl.1 (2008) [hereinafter ABA STUDY 2008]; see also
Oddi, supra note 18, at 3-6. 
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seek recovery from someone when their expectations are not
met.20 Additionally, patent attorneys, unlike other attorneys, are
required to display a certain level of technical skill in order to
practice in front of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO).21 Notwithstanding the heightened technical requirements,
the attorney’s fiduciary obligation to the client is no different than
that of any other attorney.22
From a doctrinal perspective, the term legal malpractice is in fact
a wide umbrella for tort, contract, or both as causes of action by a
client against a former attorney.23 Generally, legal malpractice is a
tort cause of action for a lawyer’s violation of the duty to a client.24
And to prevail, the plaintiff must show not only that her attorney
violated this duty but also that the duty caused her injury and
resulted in damage.25
Whether pled as a tort or contract cause of action, there are
numerous types of attorney errors that may form the basis for a
malpractice action. The American Bar Association studies the
number of malpractice claims filed and their bases, breaking the
claims into four distinct groups: administrative errors, substantive
errors, client relation errors, and intentional wrongs.26 For a patent
attorney—or any attorney, for that matter—the distinction can be
20. See Oddi, supra note 18, at 7.
21. 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2)(ii) (2008). Attorneys who wish to prosecute patents in front of
the Patent and Trademark Office must complete the Examination for Registration to Practice
in Patent Cases Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id. § 11.7(a)-(b)(1)(ii). 
22. 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 24:24, at 669. 
23. Oddi, supra note 18, at 8-9 (noting that although the theory of the cause of action may
differ, the requirements are generally the same). Interestingly, in some jurisdictions legal
malpractice is both a contract and tort action. 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 23:3, at
286 (discussing selection of the appropriate statute of limitations). In other jurisdictions, legal
malpractice, while sounding in tort, is an action for breach of contract. 1 id. § 8:1, at 1024-25. 
24. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 484, at 1385 (2000). That duty is created either
by contract or a relationship to the client. Id. Generally, the attorney owes her client the duty
to exercise the skill, care, and knowledge of a reasonable and prudent attorney in similar
circumstances. Id. § 485, at 1388. Also, in the tort context, the duty to the plaintiff may arise
“from, and because of, the attorney-client relationship.” 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, §
8:2, at 1028. 
25. Oddi, supra note 18, at 9. 
26. See ABA STUDY 2008, supra note 19, at 10 tbl.5A. Administrative errors can be
classified as those involving procedural errors, whereas substantive errors are mainly directed
at an attorney’s knowledge of the law, failure to properly apply the law, or trial strategy
choice. Id.
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crucial. At one end of the spectrum, the misconduct may involve
missed deadlines,27 misfiled applications,28 or calendar management
issues.29 At the other end, the misconduct may include defective
claim drafting,30 unfamiliarity with the law or want of technical
competence,31 or defective patent infringement prosecution.32 The
nature of the error affects the degree to which a court must discuss
patent issues. Almost all procedural errors will raise the patent
issue as an incidental matter.33 But there are also some substantive
errors—such as failure to know patent law—that raise the patent
issue collaterally and turn instead on the applicable standard of
care.34 Depending on the degree to which patent issues are present,
the court will grapple with these questions in its causation
analysis.35 Causation may, in fact, be the most problematic issue in
malpractice.36 And it plays a central role in the jurisdictional
question raised in this Note.
27. Delta Process Equip., Inc. v. New Eng. Ins. Co., 560 So. 2d 923, 924 (La. Ct. App.
1990).
28. IMT, Inc. v. Haynes & Boone, LLP, No. CIV.A 3:98-CV-2634, 1999 WL 58838, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1999) (attorney filed patent application as a continuation-in-part rather
than as an original application). 
29. Sean B. Seymore, The Competency of State Courts To Adjudicate Patent-Based
Malpractice Claims, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 443, 451 (2006). 
30. Collard & Roe, PC v. Vlacancich, 789 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(attorney drafted patent too narrowly). 
31. Commonwealth Film Processing, Inc. v. Moss & Rocovich, PC, 778 F. Supp. 283, 284-
85 (W.D. Va. 1991) (client alleged that attorney demonstrated inadequate knowledge of the
law); Voight v. Kraft, 342 F. Supp. 821, 821-22 (D. Idaho 1972) (attorney advised client to
pursue a patent that was unpatentable). 
32. See Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans LLP, No. 2:08-102-DCR, 2008 WL 3833699, at
*1 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 13, 2008); Eddings v. Glast, Phillips & Murray, No. 3:07-CV-1512-L, 2008
WL 2522544, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2008); Stratagene v. Parsons Behle & Latimer, 315 F.
Supp. 2d 765, 768 (D. Md. 2004). 
33. State courts routinely adjudicate claims when the patent issues are collateral to the
claim. See Carabotta v. Mitchell, No. 79165, 2002 WL 42948, at *1-2 (Ohio App. Ct. Jan. 10,
2002). In these situations, the attorney’s error either does not affect the patentee’s
substantive rights or the patentee has no protected patent right. As such, a state court will
not have to construe “substantive” patent issues and are perfectly capable of hearing the
claim. Seymore, supra note 29, at 469; see also infra note 119.  
34. See Voight, 342 F. Supp at 822. 
35. See infra Part III.
36. Oddi, supra note 18, at 26. 
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A. The “Suit Within a Suit”
For the plaintiff to recover against her attorney in a legal
malpractice action, she must show what “should have” happened in
the underlying action or matter “but for” the attorney’s error.37 This
requirement is commonly referred to as the “suit within a suit” or
“trial within a trial” element of malpractice.38 This is more than just
a creative label. The plaintiff is required to prove the claim that her
attorney lost39 and also that the attorney’s negligence caused that
loss.40 In most cases, the cause-in-fact requirement amounts to a
full-blown recreation of the underlying litigation, with the same
witnesses and evidence that should have been presented.41 
As an illustration, assume that an attorney represented a
plaintiff in a patent infringement suit but because of a missed filing
deadline, the infringing defendant was able to raise a defense of
invalidity.42 If the client later sued the attorney for malpractice,
then she would be required to prove that she should have won the
underlying infringement suit absent the attorney’s error to demon-
strate that this caused her loss. 
Although the suit within a suit requirement is extensive, the
disposition of the malpractice action often turns on a question of
fact. Causation-in-fact will involve all the legal issues that would
have been heard in the underlying action. Thus, if the question is
whether an attorney’s error caused a loss of claim, the issue may be
a matter of law for the court.43 But when the analysis depends on
37. 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 35:12, at 1205. Mallen and Smith note, however,
that often states use the phrases “would have” (subjective) and “should have” (objective)
interchangeably. Id. at 1098. But the subjectivity of this substitution can be ameliorated as
long as the court approaches the inquiry with reference to what a reasonable judge or jury
“‘would have’ decided.” Id.
38. Id. at 1205. This Note will refer to this element simply as the “suit within a suit.”
Causation-in-fact is also known as “but for” causation. Id.
39. DOBBS, supra note 24, § 486, at 1391. In patent cases this can lead to rather technical
cases in state courts with no experience in these matters. It is these full-blown patent
hearings that have led some to argue that these claims belong in federal court. See Seymore,
supra note 29, at 475-79.
40. DOBBS, supra note 24, § 486, at 1390. 
41. 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 35:12, at 1206.
42. This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Air Measurement Technology, Inc. v.
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
43. 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 35:15, at 1253. 
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factual inquiries to determine whether the attorney’s actions were
a substantial factor44 in the result or whether there would have been
a better result without the attorney’s error—requiring the plaintiff
to prove the suit within a suit—the ruling turns on an issue of fact.45
In addition, the question of proximate cause—whether the attor-
ney’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury—usually raises a
question of fact.46
Though a malpractice suit is sometimes described as the “concep-
tual” equivalent of the underlying action,47 this description can be
misleading. While it may be instructive to think of the suit within
a suit element as the equivalent of the trial for purposes of scope,
that description breaks down when one considers the nature of relief
afforded to the aggrieved client. A malpractice claim allows her to
recover against the attorney but not against the hypothetical
defendant in the underlying action.48 By proving the suit within a
suit, and the rest of the elements, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
from the attorney what she would have recovered if the case had
been tried properly, or even brought, as the case may be.49 In other
words, “damages are the monetary value of an injury,”50 not
restoration of the underlying right itself.
44. Whether an actor’s negligent conduct is a substantial factor in producing harm is
determined with regard to several considerations, including: the number of other factors
contributing to the harm and the extent of their effects; whether the actor’s conduct created
a continuous and active force or series of forces in operation up to the time of the harm, or
created a condition harmless until acted upon by other forces, not the fault of the actor; and
the lapse of time between the actor’s conduct and the harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433 (1965). 
45. 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 35:15, at 1253-54 (“Usually, the answer to this
issue concerning litigation malpractice is the result of a recreation of the underlying action
in which the error occurred, a determination inextricably involved with factual matters.”).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 35:1, at 1091; see also Seymore, supra note 29, at 456 (quoting Mallen & Smith).
48. See DOBBS, supra note 24, § 492, at 1405-09.
49. Id. at 1407.
50. 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 21:1, at 2. Although this distinction may seem
obvious or trivial now, this Note contends that it is critical for determining whether the claim
is “substantial” and “disruptive” according to the Court’s most recent “arising under”
jurisprudence. See infra Part IV. 
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B. Preemption Narrowly Construed: Rules, Regulations, and
Ethical Codes for Patent Prosecution
The USPTO regulates patent practice by setting certain stan-
dards of attorney competency and conduct.51 Despite the existence
of multiple ethical codes for a patent attorney during prosecution,52
there is no express federal cause of action for patent attorney mal-
practice.53 Rather, the USPTO regulations preempt state law only
“to the extent necessary for the [USPTO] to accomplish its [f]ederal
objectives.”54 The USPTO Code is not the only set of rules governing
patent practice; rather, it exists concurrently with those rules that
a state already has to govern attorney conduct.55 Recognizing this,
the Federal Circuit has interpreted preemption quite narrowly.56
II. “ARISING UNDER” AND THE EMBEDDED FEDERAL QUESTION
Undoubtedly, causation poses difficult questions for a court in a
substantive malpractice claim. These difficult questions may also
influence a federal court’s jurisdiction analysis, if the underlying
suit involved a federal claim. In that case, a court must determine
whether this federal ingredient gives rise to federal question
jurisdiction. Despite a broad jurisdictional grant of authority in the
Constitution to hear cases “arising under” federal law,57 the federal
51. See generally 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-.170 (2008) (defining attorney qualifications and ethical
standards for representation of others before the USPTO).
52. See id. §§ 10.22-.23, -.38, -.47-.49, -.77, -.89.
53. See id. § 10.1 (“Nothing in this part shall be construed to preempt the authority of
each [s]tate to regulate the practice of law.”). 
54. Id.
55. David Hricik, Trouble Waiting To Happen: Malpractice and Ethical Issues in Patent
Prosecution, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 385, 391-93 (2003). Professor Hricik compiled a comprehensive
study of the various ethical codes governing a patent lawyer and the corresponding ethical
problems facing patent lawyers today. Id. at 388-91. In addition to the USPTO code, a patent
lawyer must be familiar with the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the state bar disciplinary rules. Id. at 388. 
56. Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  
57. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties.”).
For a comprehensive history of the term “arising under,” see Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The
Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 263 (2007) (noting how the
Framers borrowed jurisdictional principles from English courts).
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courts had to rely on Congress to describe the boundaries of their
jurisdiction.58 Congress later provided that statutory grant of power
in the general federal question jurisdiction statute.59 Tracking the
statute’s language, the claim must be one that “aris[es] under”
federal law.60 Notwithstanding Congress’s decision to use the same
broad constitutional grant in Article III, the Supreme Court has
consistently given the statutory grant of authority a narrower
application.61 In straightforward cases, federal jurisdiction lies over
cases that involve both a right and remedy provided for by
Congress.62 But in cases where one or both of these are absent, the
question is anything but straightforward.63
For nearly a century, the Court has allowed lower courts to
exercise jurisdiction over state law claims if the plaintiff’s right or
remedy depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law.64 But the Court has been notoriously tepid when it comes to
usurping state courts’ jurisdiction, noting that “the phrase ‘arising
under’ masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of fed-
eral and state authority and the proper management of the federal
judicial system.”65 Thus, the requirement that the federal issue be
“substantial”—and therefore what opens the federal courthouse
door—is often not clear.
The Court has rejected the notion that the concept of “arising
under” can be captured under the rubric of a “single, precise
58. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986) (“That
[constitutional] grant of power, however, is not self-executing.”).
59. The first statutory grant of power was included in the Judiciary Act of 1875, § 1, 18
Stat. 470. The modern general jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, contains substantially
similar language to the first congressional act.  
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).  
61. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807.
62. For example, in a patent infringement action, Congress specifically authorizes patent
owners a federal cause of action for infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006), and provides a
damages remedy if they prevail. Id. § 284.
63. For an interesting case in which Congress provided a remedy but no federal cause of
action, see Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 513-14 (1900).
64. See, e.g., Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (holding that
a stockholder’s suit to enjoin a bank from investing in certain farm loan bonds “ar[o]se under”
the Constitution and federal law because the stockholder’s suit turned on the constitutionality
of the authorizing act). 
65. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983)). 
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definition.”66 Yet a test has emerged for federal jurisdiction over
state law claims turning on federal issues. Jurisdiction in federal
court is appropriate if federal law creates the cause of action, or if
the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal law, which the federal court can
adjudicate without infringing on any congressionally approved
federal-state division of labor.67 Application of the second part of this
test has not produced uniform results. 
A. Recent Supreme Court Decisions Articulating the Meaning of
“Arising Under”  
For § 1338(a) jurisdictional inquiries, courts should look to § 1331
jurisprudence to decide the scope of their jurisdiction.68 But even
with an enunciated test for embedded federal question cases, the
meaning of the second basis for federal jurisdiction is not so clear.
In addition to meeting the test’s literal requirements, courts must
consider the federalism considerations interwoven in the jurispru-
dence. Two Supreme Court decisions shed light on the precise scope
and applicability of the doctrine. 
In Merrell Dow, the respondent brought several claims against
the petitioner for injuries sustained following the ingestion of the
petitioner’s drug Benedectin.69 The respondent’s fourth theory of
liability was that the petitioner was negligent per se for violating
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s (FDCA) labeling stand-
ards.70 Petitioner removed the action to federal court.71 The district
court dismissed the case on grounds of forum non conveniens, but
the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding removal improper.72
The Supreme Court was careful to note the need for “sensitive
judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the
66. Id. at 808. 
67. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 308, 314 (2005). 
68. See infra Part II.B. 
69. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805-06.
70. Id. Specifically, the respondents alleged that there should have been warning labels
on the bottles and that violation of the federal statutes was the proximate cause of their
children’s injuries. Id.
71. Id. at 806. A party may remove an action to federal court if the action could have been
filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).
72. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806-07. 
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federal system” when construing the meaning of “arising under.”73
Indeed, the Court rejected broad treatment of what “arises under”
federal law and demanded that courts construe their jurisdiction
“with an eye to[ward] practicality and necessity.”74 Despite this
language emphasizing the need for sensitive judgments, the Court’s
holding seemed rigid and uncompromising.75 Because Congress had
not provided a federal remedy for a violation of the FDCA, there was
no federal jurisdiction over the respondent’s state law claim.76
Referring to the test most closely associated with “arising under”
jurisprudence, the Court concluded that the federal issue was not
“substantial” enough to elicit a federal forum.77 Indeed, the Court
found it similarly troublesome for courts to exercise federal
jurisdiction and provide remedies for state law claims “solely
because the violation of the federal statute is said to be ... a ‘proxi-
mate cause’ under state law.”78
The lower courts, however, struggled mightily with the holding of
Merrell Dow.79 This led the Court to address the scope of the phrase
“arising under” in a state law claim nineteen years later in Grable.80
After ruling on embedded federal questions in a state tort context,
the Court turned to a federal question embedded in another classic
73. Id. at 810.
74. Id.
75. E.g., Adam P.M. Tarleton, In Search of the Welcome Mat: The Scope of Statutory
Federal Question Jurisdiction After Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering
& Manufacturing, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1394, 1397 (2006).
76. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 812 (“[I]t would flout congressional intent to provide a
private federal remedy for the violation of the federal statute.”).
77. Id. at 814. Drawing on precedent, the Court reiterated that federal jurisdiction was
appropriate when “it appear[ed] that some substantial, disputed question of federal law [was]
a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims.” Id. at 813 (quoting Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983)). For the Merrell Dow Court,
Congress’s decision not to provide a federal remedy for a violation of the FDCA was proof that
the statutory violation was not substantial for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. Id.
at 814.
78. Id. at 812. 
79. See, e.g., Jason Pozner, Comment, The More Things Change, The More They Stay the
Same: Grable & Sons v. Darue Engineering Does Not Resolve the Split over Merrell Dow v.
Thompson, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 533 (2006) (detailing the post-Merrell Dow difficulties
that courts had looking for implied or express private rights of action in federal statutes). The
author explains how some courts read Merrell Dow narrowly and applied the “cause of action”
test from American Well Works, whereas others chose to ignore Merrell Dow as an outlier and
continued to employ the Franchise Tax test. Id. at 556-59.
80. Id. at 570.
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state law claim—the quiet title action.81 Grable sued to recover
property the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) previously seized to
satisfy a tax delinquency.82 Grable argued that the statute required
personal service, rather than the actual notice he received.83
According to Grable, Darue’s title, acquired from the IRS by
quitclaim deed,84 was deficient.85
After Darue removed to federal court,86 the District Court for the
Western District of Michigan upheld jurisdiction despite the lack of
federal right of action to enforce Grable’s claim.87 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit similarly upheld the finding of
jurisdiction.88 Both courts reached the merits and agreed that the
statute did not require personal service, but rather the actual notice
constituted substantial compliance with the statute.89
Analyzing the embedded federal question jurisprudence, the
Court stated the test for “arising under” as follows: “does a state law
claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and
substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing
any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities.”90 Eschewing the necessity of a federal remedy, the
Court found federal jurisdiction because resolution of the state claim
would turn solely on construction of the statute and the Government
had a significant interest in seeing that the statute was interpreted
correctly given the importance of “vindicat[ing] its own adminis-
trative action.”91 And the Court stressed the miniscule effect on the
federal-state division of labor given the rarity of state title cases
requiring resolution of a “genuine disagreement over federal tax
title provisions.”92
81. Id. at 571.
82. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005).
83. Id. at 311. The statute provided that the IRS give “notice in writing ... to the owner
of the property ... [a]s soon as practicable after the seizure.” 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a) (2006). 
84. An owner of seized property has 180 days to reclaim the property before the IRS will
sell it at auction. 26 U.S.C. § 6337(b)(1) (2006).  
85. Grable, 545 U.S. at 311. 
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 314. 
91. Id. at 315. 
92. Id.
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Despite the fact that federal law did not provide for federal quiet
title actions,93 the Court cautioned that Merrell Dow did not turn a
federal cause of action “from a sufficient condition ... into a neces-
sary one” for federal jurisdiction.94 Rather, the Merrell Dow Court
saw the lack of a federal action as evidence that the federal question
was not substantial and that Congress would disapprove of a federal
forum in this situation.95 To further stress the point, the Court
noted Merrell Dow’s approval of Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co.,96 in which a federal cause of action was also lacking, yet the
Court found federal question jurisdiction.97 For the Grable Court,
Merrell Dow was simply an example of the Court making “common-
sense” jurisdictional judgments that Justice Cardozo had called for
during his tenure.98
Seemingly, the Court resolved the split caused by Merrell Dow
and enunciated a test for federal jurisdiction over state claims.99 Yet
scholars have argued over Grable’s reach, that is, whether it
expanded or contracted the federal courts’ power to hear state
claims.100 This Note argues that, when read together, Grable and
93. Id. at 317. 
94. Id.
95. The Court explained:
Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating the absence of a federal
private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the
“sensitive judgments about congressional intent” that § 1331 requires.... The
Court saw the fact as worth some consideration in the assessment of
substantiality. But its primary importance emerged when the Court treated the
combination of no federal cause of action and no preemption of state remedies
for misbranding as an important clue to Congress’s conception of the scope of
jurisdiction to be exercised under § 1331.... For if the federal labeling standard
without a federal cause of action could get a state claim into federal court, so
could any other federal standard without a federal cause of action. And that
would have meant a tremendous number of cases.
Id. at 318 (discussing Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986)). 
96. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
97. Id. at 317-18 (citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12).
98. See id. at 313.
99. Cf. Pozner, supra note 79, at 573-74 (criticizing the lack of clarity in the Grable Court’s
opinion and detailing the circuits’ treatment of Grable). 
100. See, e.g., Lonny S. Hoffman, Intersections of State and Federal Power: State Judges,
Federal Law, and the “Reliance Principle,” 81 TUL. L. REV. 283, 298 (2006) (arguing that the
federal jurisdiction over embedded federal questions is a narrow category). But cf. Lisa M.
Norrett, Grable & Sons Reaffirms the Smith Approach to Federal Question Jurisdiction, PROD.
LIAB. LAW & STRATEGY (L.J. Newsls., New York, N.Y.) Sept. 2005 at 7, available at
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Merrell Dow stand for the proposition that federal jurisdiction
extends only to those cases with a significant federal issue at
stake.101 A substantial question of federal law is not substantial in
and of itself. Rather than a simplistic case-by-case approach to
jurisdiction, the Court’s decisions illustrate that a court must take
future effects—that is, the number of similar filings in federal
court—into account when deciding jurisdictional effects. Or a ripple
may soon turn into a tsunami. 
To make matters more complicated, the phrase “arising under”
appears in other jurisdiction statutes as well. One such statute is
the jurisdictional statute for patent, copyright, and trademark
claims.
B. Patent Jurisdiction
In § 1338(a), Congress gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over patent cases.102 But this does not foreclose jurisdictional
problems, because the case must still “aris[e] under” the patent
laws.103 In an effort to establish uniformity in patent law, Congress
created the Federal Circuit.104 Unlike its sister courts of appeals, the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is based on subject matter. If the claim
is one in which the district court’s jurisdiction was “based, in whole
or in part, on [§] 1338,” then the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction of the appeal.105
Despite a separate appellate court and a different jurisdictional
statute, many of the § 1338(a) jurisdictional requirements mirror
the Court’s rulings on § 1331 requirements. As with § 1331 claims,
the reference point for the jurisdictional inquiry is the well-pleaded
http://www.mckennalong.com/media/site_files/349_Artic001.pdf (arguing that the post-Grable
scope of federal question jurisdiction is rather broad). 
101. See Tarleton, supra note 75, at 1408. 
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive ... in patent, plant variety
protection and copyright cases.”).
103. Id.
104. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. 
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006). 
1252 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1237
complaint.106 Under Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co.,107 the
patentee plaintiff must plead a patent case in her complaint or
declaration.108 A patent case sets up a right under the patent laws
as ground for recovery, whereas a patent question—which can be
heard in state court—raises the issue incidentally or in the
answer.109
Notwithstanding Pratt, the reach of federal courts’ jurisdiction to
patent cases was still unclear. In Christianson v. Colt Industries
Operating Corp.,110 the Supreme Court had to decide which of two
federal appellate courts would hear an antitrust action that
required application of the patent laws.111 The Court applied § 1331
jurisprudence to § 1338(a) cases because both statutes relied on the
phrase “arising under.”112 “Linguistic consistency,” the Court said,
required similar interpretation.113 In short, for a patent claim to
come into federal court, the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint must
arise under the patent laws within the meaning of the Court’s
§ 1331 “aris[ing] under” jurisprudence.114
106. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1996). The well-
pleaded complaint rule requires that the federal issue appear on the face of the complaint and
not as a counterclaim or defense, whether anticipated or crucial. Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1908). Because patent-based malpractice suits
necessarily raise the patent question in causation and damages deliberations, well-pleaded
complaint problems are largely absent. The patent issue is necessarily raised in the complaint
as proper pleading of causation.
107. 168 U.S. 255 (1897). In Pratt, the plaintiff brought a contract action and the defendant
raised issues of patent enforceability and infringement as defenses for rescinding the contract.
Id. at 257-58.
108. Id. at 259.
109. Id.
110. 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
111. Id. at 800-01.
112. See id. at 808-09.
113. Id. In fact, the Court said: 
[Section] 1338(a) jurisdiction ... extend[s] only to those cases in which a well-
pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause
of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution
of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary
element of one of the well-pleaded claims.
Id. The second part of this test was taken from the Court’s then recent decision in Franchise
Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983) (addressing the
question of whether a federal statute preempted a state’s power to levy on funds held in
trust).
114. The Court reaffirmed this proposition in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Systems Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002). But see John Donofrio & Edward C.
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So with Christianson and Grable in mind, a test is clear for
exclusive jurisdiction under § 1338(a). Jurisdiction extends to those
cases in which: (1) federal patent law creates the cause of action, or
(2) the plaintiff sets up some right in her well-pleaded complaint
whose resolution necessarily depends on a disputed, substantial
federal question, over which the courts can take jurisdiction without
disrupting any congressionally approved federal-state division of
labor. Applying this second test is difficult. As stated earlier, there
are underlying considerations and implicit requirements for federal
jurisdiction over embedded claims that inform the application of the
Grable test—namely, a concern for future effects and the nature of
the federal interest at stake.115
The dichotomy between exercising jurisdiction over important
federal issues and relying on states to apply federal law presents
especially difficult questions in the context of a patent-based
malpractice claim requiring adjudication of the patentee’s substan-
tive rights—such as infringement, validity, or enforcement. If the
attorney’s alleged negligence cost the plaintiff her patent infringe-
ment suit, then the plaintiff cannot recover without showing that
she should have prevailed in that underlying action “but for” the
attorney’s negligence. Without a doubt, a substantive patent suit
for infringement is properly within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts. But malpractice is based on entirely different
substantive questions and considerations. Malpractice claims
represent an undoubtedly traditional exercise of state disciplinary
authority.116 State law provides both the right and remedy.117 But
the court will have to grapple with patent law and apply it to
hypothetical facts. These competing considerations raise difficult
questions for a court facing the jurisdiction question. Is there a
distinction for jurisdictional purposes between a substantive patent
Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.: The Application of Federal
Question Precedent to Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1835, 1858-59
(1996) (arguing that Congress did not intend for § 1331 jurisprudence to apply in § 1338
decisions and calling for a more flexible approach).
115. See supra Part II.A.
116. Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1167 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing ERISA preemption
of attorney malpractice suits); see also Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 339 (5th Cir.
2008) (discussing the rare interference by federal law with the state regulation of the practice
of law).
117. 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 24:24, at 6.
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infringement claim and a patent infringement claim heard as a part
of the suit within a suit in a malpractice action? The Federal Circuit
answered this question in the negative. 
  III. COURT DECISIONS APPLYING GRABLE TO PATENT-BASED  
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS WHEN CAUSATION RAISES INFRINGEMENT
The patent malpractice plaintiff has to rely on the second basis
for jurisdiction because there is no federal cause of action for this
claim. Rather, it is a state law claim with a federal ingredient. Note
that the plaintiff must satisfy both prongs of the Grable standard
before exclusive federal jurisdiction is proper.118 A substantial,
disputed patent question is insufficient if entertaining the action in
federal court would upset the balance Congress struck when it
delineated the jurisdiction of the federal and state courts over these
claims.119
Confronting this question in Air Measurement Technologies, Inc.
v. Akin Gump Straus Hauer & Feld, LLP,120 the Federal Circuit
decided that patent-based malpractice claims that required
causation analysis on infringement, enforceability, and validity
issues were properly in federal court under § 1338(a).121 The court
explained:
[W]e would consider it illogical for the Western District of Texas
to have jurisdiction under § 1338 to hear the underlying
infringement suit and for us then to determine that the same
court does not have jurisdiction under § 1338 to hear the same
substantial patent question in the “case within a case” context
of a state malpractice claim.122
118. See Hoffman, supra note 100, at 300. 
119. Even before Grable, courts routinely ruled that patent-based malpractice claims only
raising patent law collaterally should be in state court. See, e.g., Commonwealth Film
Processing, Inc. v. Moss & Rocovich, PC, 778 F. Supp. 283, 286 (W.D. Va. 1991). In most
instances, the patentee had no protected patent right. Issues of infringement, validity, and
enforcement, therefore, were absent. But in a situation in which these substantive patent
rights are before the court because of the suit within a suit, it is a question of whether patent-
based malpractice “arises under” § 1338(a). 
120. 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
121. Id. at 1273.
122. Id. at 1269.
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The Federal Circuit saw this case as exactly the kind of “common-
sense” judgment that the Grable Court endorsed.123 But realistically,
the Federal Circuit’s ruling advocates a much different approach
than the one the Court has articulated for jurisdiction over embed-
ded federal issues. Although the Federal Circuit applied the
language of Grable, it ignored the federalism concerns at the heart
of the opinion. Indeed, the Federal Circuit was more concerned with
the case-at-bar whereas the lesson of Grable and Merrell Dow is
largely that courts should instead focus on the future effects of
finding jurisdiction over a particular type of claim.124
But consider Air Measurement in more detail. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant attorneys’ errors125 allowed the patent
infringers to raise defenses of invalidity and unenforceability.126 The
plaintiff filed in Texas state court and the defendant attorneys later
removed to federal district court based on § 1338(a).127 The district
court subsequently denied a motion to remand128 and certified the
issue of whether the claim was properly in federal court for
interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit.129
Finding in favor of jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit explained that
because Texas state law required the plaintiff to prove the merits of
the underlying action—the suit within a suit—the claim necessarily
raised a substantial question of patent law, specifically, patent
123. Id. (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005)).
124. Hoffman, supra note 100, at 300 (“It would seem, then, that resolution of the federal
question at issue has to be such that it will impact a wide range of persons and behavior. By
contrast, an issue relevant only in a single circumstance is far less likely to qualify as
substantial.”).
125. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the attorney failed to file the initial patent
application within the one year “on sale” bar prescribed by 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Air
Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1266. And the attorney failed to disclose two prior patents to the
USPTO, which allowed the infringers to argue inequitable conduct by the plaintiff’s attorneys.
Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. As an interesting aside, the parties switched positions on the jurisdiction question
during the litigation. Initially, the defendant attorneys removed to federal court and the
plaintiffs opposed, but later the defendants filed the motion for remand. Id. at 1266-67.
Although this is a minor point, lower federal courts should account for the implications of such
litigation strategies when discussing the Grable analysis and the impact on both federal and
state courts’ dockets.
129. Id. at 1267. 
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infringement.130 And because the parties disagreed over whether the
attorneys’ errors affected the infringement action, the claim was
disputed.131 Later, when explaining that Grable and Empire did not
alter § 1338(a) jurisprudence,132 the court noted that with § 1338(a)
Congress struck the balance of federal-state division of labor for
patent infringement claims in favor of federal jurisdiction.133
The Federal Circuit confronted a similar question in Immunocept,
LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP.134 In Immunocept, the court held
that a patent-based malpractice claim arose under § 1338(a).135
Because the claimed error involved claim drafting and would
require adjudication of the patent’s scope, the court reasoned that
its ruling would essentially determine whether competitors could
copy the plaintiff’s method without infringing the patent.136 Like Air
Measurement, the court was convinced that jurisdiction was proper
given that claim scope determination was a substantial question of
federal law.137 Again the parties disputed the question of whether
the patent’s scope was in fact too narrow, such that copiers could
avoid an infringement suit.138 Oddly enough, the court argued that
the second prong of Grable was satisfied by Congress’s decision to
create the Federal Circuit to establish uniformity in patent law.139
Compare Air Measurement and Immunocept with a recent
decision by the Nebraska Supreme Court. In New Tek Manufactur-
ing, Inc. v. Beehner,140 the plaintiff client sued his attorney after the
attorney failed to pay a maintenance fee on a farming method
patent (’365 patent) dooming his reissue patent application (’080
130. Id. at 1269.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1271 (“However, the concern about federalism in Grable is not new, nor does
Grable change § 1338 caselaw.”).
133. Id. at 1271-72.
134. 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Note that Immunocept and Air Measurement were
decided on the same day. See Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1262.
135. Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1283.
136. Id. at 1284-85.
137. Id. at 1285 (“Because patent claim scope defines the scope of patent protection, ... we
surely consider claim scope to be a substantial question of patent law.”).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 702 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 2005), aff’d, 751 N.W.2d 135 (Neb. 2008).
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patent), which included expanded claim protection.141 The plaintiff
paid the delinquent fee and revived his ’365 patent; however, revival
did not protect the plaintiff from infringing uses while the ’365
patent was not in force.142 The court had to decide whether the client
could have won an infringement suit against another similar
farming device.143 The plaintiff claimed that he would have won an
infringement action with the ’080 patent and its expanded protec-
tion.144
Nebraska, like Texas, required the plaintiff to meet the suit
within a suit requirement in a malpractice action. Despite this, the
Nebraska Supreme Court held that jurisdiction in state court was
proper.145 Reasoning that patent infringement of the new patent was
“relevant only insofar as it helps [the court] to determine who would
have prevailed in that hypothetical [infringement] action,” the court
argued that patent law was raised only collaterally in a traditional
state tort action.146 And the court added that the federal interest in
the prosecution of a patent infringement over an expired patent was
nonexistent.147
Although not a patent case, Singh v. Duane Morris LLP,148
dealt with § 1338(a) for a trademark-based malpractice action.149
Confronting the same suit within a suit requirement, the malprac-
tice claim was based on trademark infringement and whether the
141. Id. at 343. A fuller treatment of the facts is necessary here. The plaintiff instructed
the attorney to prosecute a reissue application with expanded protection after seeing a
potentially infringing product. Id. The old patent’s maintenance fee was still outstanding
during this time, but the new patent was eventually granted. Id. Over two years later, the
plaintiff, with new counsel, tried to pay the maintenance fee for the new patent, but the
USPTO told him that the new patent had expired due to the outstanding fee on the old patent.
Id. at 343-44. So for those two years, the plaintiff had no protection against infringing devices. 
142. Id. at 344.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 346.
146. Id.
147. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court remanded the action to the district court on the
issue of damages. Id. at 355. During that determination, the court ordered briefing on the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction in light of the decisions in Air Measurement and
Immunocept. New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner, 751 N.W.2d 135, 144 (Neb. 2008).
Notwithstanding the Federal Circuit decisions, the court decided that jurisdiction was proper
in state court. Id.
148. 538 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2008).
149. Id. at 336. 
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attorney had failed to adduce secondary meaning adequately.150
The Fifth Circuit disagreed that federal jurisdiction was proper
and remanded the action to state court.151 Though trademark
infringement was “significant to [plaintiff ’s] claim,” the court
reasoned that the issue was not substantial enough to evoke a
federal forum.152 Relying on Merrell Dow, the court reasoned that
federal trademark law did not provide a cause of action for trade-
mark malpractice and had purposes wholly apart from “regulating
attorney malpractice.”153 The court then explained that allowing
these claims into federal court would be entirely “disruptive.”154 The
court reasoned:
Because all Texas malpractice plaintiffs must prove that they
would have prevailed in their prior suits, federal jurisdiction
could extend to every instance in which a lawyer commits
alleged malpractice during the litigation of a federal claim. That
would constitute a substantial usurpation of state authority in
an area in which states have traditionally been dominant.155
The court also noted a distinction between the trademark malprac-
tice suit and the patent-based suit.156 The exclusive jurisdiction
conferred by § 1338(a) does not extend to trademark suits.157 But as
this Note argues in the next Part, this distinction does not warrant
extending federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction to patent-based
malpractice claims. 
150. Id. at 337.
151. Id. at 341.
152. Id. at 339. 
153. Id. On this point the court was a bit off the mark. The Merrell Dow Court was
convinced that the federal issue was not “substantial” because Congress provided for no
private right of action for violating the FDCA, the underlying statute. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 (1986). In the trademark case, the plaintiff would argue
that the private right of action is the trademark infringement suit, which he has to prove as
a part of the malpractice claim. But even meeting this test does not satisfy the standard for
jurisdiction when the court considers the nature of the underlying action and the remedies
afforded the plaintiff for violating that standard. See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying
text.
154. Singh, 538 F.3d at 339. 
155. Id. at 340.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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IV. UNDERSTANDING GRABLE, BALANCING FEDERAL INTERESTS,
AND RELYING ON STATE COURTS
A court considering federal jurisdiction over a § 1338(a) claim
must pay close attention not only to Grable’s literal requirements
but also to the underlying, intricate concerns at the heart of the
opinion. Indeed, the plaintiff bears a significant burden to show a
federal issue of wider importance than just the case-at-bar.158 The
controverted federal issue must be essential not only to the
plaintiff ’s claim but also resolution of the claim must impact future
parties and claims.159 The Merrell Dow Court labeled this as a
significant federal interest at stake in the resolution of the claim.160
In fact, a court should factor many considerations into a jurisdic-
tional inquiry after Grable. Notwithstanding the presence of
substantive patent rights, the federal courts should not exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over patent-based malpractice claims because
these considerations are absent. 
A. Patent-Based Malpractice Claims Raising Substantive Issues
Will Rarely Meet the First Prong of Grable
After Grable, a court should evaluate three important aspects of
the plaintiff ’s claim to decide whether a claim meets the first prong
of Grable under § 1338(a). First, the federal issue should principally
be a question of law, not fact. Building on that distinction, a claim
meets the dispute requirement when a court must construe the
meaning or scope of a federal provision. And finally, courts should
question whether granting relief in favor of the client-patentee
furthers the federal provision’s purposes. Patent-based malpractice
claims fail to meet these benchmarks and should be remanded to
state court. 
Although some scholars have rejected the question of law
requirement for federal jurisdiction over embedded claims,161 this is
158. Hoffman, supra note 100, at 300. 
159. Id.
160. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986). 
161. REDISH, supra note 2, at 64. 
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a distinction the Court’s recent decisions seem to endorse.162 Thus,
a plaintiff whose claim is largely “fact-bound and situation-specific”
would fail to meet the threshold for jurisdiction.163 Most patent-
based malpractice claims raise disputes over the application of the
law to the facts, not pure law. Consider Air Measurement as an
illustration. The attorney missed several deadlines allowing in-
fringers to raise certain affirmative defenses.164 So the court must
apply patent law to a set of hypothetical facts—whether the plaintiff
would have prevailed against the infringers if the attorney acted
prudently.165 “But for” causation may raise questions of law, but
ultimately, the issue of proximate cause—whether the attorney’s
negligence caused the injury—will be one of fact.166
In both the Air Measurement and Immunocept opinions, the court
justified the federal question as disputed because the parties
disagreed with regard to the potential infringement and claim scope,
respectively. But this essentially eliminated the Grable “dispute”
requirement by switching the focus from the federal provision to the
parties and their fact disagreements.167 Resolution of the plaintiff ’s
claim in Grable, however, required choosing between opposite
constructions of the federal statute.168 So resolution of the dispute
would resolve the case not only between the parties but also future
parties.169 Put differently, in a future quiet title action raising a
162. Compare Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700-01
(2006) (“In contrast [to Grable], Empire’s reimbursement claim ... is fact-bound and situation-
specific.”), with Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 315
(2005) (“The meaning of the federal tax provision is an important issue of federal law that
sensibly belongs in federal court.” (emphasis added)). And the distinction is one that older
case law endorses as well. See Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912) (holding that
federal question jurisdiction lies over state law claims only when it “really and substantially
involv[ed] a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of [federal]
law”).
163. Empire, 547 U.S. at 700-01. 
164. Air Measurement Tech., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, 504 F.3d 1262,
1266-67 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
165. Id. at 1268-69.
166. 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 34:15, at 1253-54.
167. Compare Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (“The parties, however, dispute whether there was a drafting mistake.”), with Air
Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1272 (“For example, patent infringement is disputed, for there is
no concession by Akin Gump that the prior SCBA litigants infringed AMT’s patents.”). 
168. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg. 545 U.S. 308, 314-15 (2005). 
169. Id. at 315 n.3. 
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similar notice issue, the federal element simply would not be
substantial and disputed because a federal court had already settled
the issue. Patent-based malpractice claims will rarely meet this
standard. Resolution of the patent issue in a malpractice claim will
not have the same far-reaching effects as deciding the same issue in
a substantive patent suit because the claims are largely “fact-bound
and situation-specific.”170 The patent issue will have no effect in a
future case, which will almost undoubtedly hinge on distinguishable
facts.171 To the extent these malpractice cases are decided in state
court, the federal courts will not be obliged to follow the state court
resolution of the patent issue in a federal substantive patent suit,
which is squarely within the federal court’s exclusive jurisdiction.
The disputed issue must also be a substantial one. The Federal
Circuit has clearly established that infringement, validity, and
enforceability are “substantial question[s] of federal patent law,”
appropriately under § 1338(a) jurisdiction.172 A substantial issue,
remember, will “indicat[e] a serious federal interest in claiming
the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”173
Undoubtedly, there is a strong federal interest and advantage to
bringing patent infringement suits in federal court—namely,
uniformity across the patent system. But patent-based malpractice
presents a different situation partly because of the parties involved
and the nature of the remedy, especially for malpractice claims
involving infringement.174
Note first that in a patent-based malpractice claim the infringe-
ment defendants are not parties to the action. The claim is between
the patentee and her attorney. Should the client prevail over her
former attorney, the likely remedy is money damages representing
that which the patentee should have recovered in the infringement
170. Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700-01 (2006).
171. If a hypothetical patent infringement suit is decided as part of a malpractice claim,
its precedential weight is extremely low. Just as no two patent infringement suits present the
same facts, no two malpractice actions will present exactly the same facts. 
172. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(enforcement and validity), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys.,
Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478-79 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (infringement). 
173. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313.
174. See supra Part I.A.
1262 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1237
action absent the negligent behavior.175 But this judgment does not
affect the infringing defendant’s rights. She may continue to sell or
license her product, because there was no judgment against her in
the underlying action. In this sense, when a patent infringement
suit is part of a malpractice suit within a suit, patent law is less
substantial because the judgment does not advance patent law’s
primary goals, reaching uniform decisions176 and providing patent
actors with proper incentives.177 Patent-based malpractice grounded
in defective claim scope is no more defensible,178 because it is a
ruling on whether a hypothetical patent with greater scope would
provide patent protection when the actual, narrower patent does
not. Indeed the court will have to ascertain whether the attorney’s
error cost the client greater patent protection, but the patentee does
not have rights with respect to that greater scope. Like malpractice
claims predicated on hypothetical infringement, malpractice claims
based on hypothetical claim scope present a less substantial federal
issue.179
Some may argue that Merrell Dow’s holding presents a strong
counterargument because there is a private right of action for
patent infringement, supporting federal jurisdiction in this sce-
nario.180 But again, the parties and remedy involved distinguish
a patent-based malpractice claim from the situation in Merrell
Dow. In Merrell Dow, the presence of a private right of action
for violations of the federal labeling statute would have allowed
175. 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 21:1, at 2.  
176. Tal Kedem, Note, Secondary Liability for Actively Inducing Patent Infringement:
Which Intentions Pave the Road?, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1465, 1477 (2007).
177. Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits, 116 YALE L.J. 1284, 1297 (2007).
178. See Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
179. This argument would not extend to cases in which the patentee’s actual rights are at
stake. For example, if the court determines the patent’s present validity or enforcement
capabilities in the malpractice action, this would seemingly be a distinguishable set of facts.
But when the malpractice action is based on a prior judgment of validity or enforceability or
when the patentee’s rights are extinct, the argument applies. Although the Federal Circuit
previously approved of the adjudication of patent issues in state court, see Christianson v. Colt
Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 486 U.S.
800, 819 (1988), that attitude may be waning in the wake of Hunter, Air Measurement, and
Immunocept.
180. Remember a private right of action is not necessary for federal question jurisdiction,
but presence of such a private right would bear on the issue of substantiality. See Grable &
Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 305, 318 (2005). 
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the plaintiffs to sue the violators of the statute—Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals. But this simply is not the case with a patent-
based malpractice claim in which all the parties to the underlying
private right of action are not involved in the malpractice claim. The
remedy is substantially different than that in a substantive patent
infringement suit.181
In addition to the three considerations presented above, a federal
court can also look to congressional intent to weigh a claim’s
substantiality.182 By exercising jurisdiction over malpractice claims
incorporating a patent infringement issue, a federal court would
contravene congressional intent. As noted before, malpractice is a
state law right and remedy. If patent-based malpractice claims are
properly in federal court, insofar as they raise a substantive patent
issue in the causation analysis, the courts will essentially provide
a federal remedy for malpractice where Congress has not spoken.183
And where Congress is silent on the issue of a private federal action,
the courts should consider the disruptive effect of finding jurisdic-
tion—that is, the increased number of filings—over that particular
claim.184 As discussed below, federal jurisdiction over patent-based
malpractice claims is severely disruptive when the court bases
jurisdiction on substantive patent issues raised only as a part of a
causation analysis because it opens the federal courthouse door to
myriad factual scenarios.185
With this discussion in mind, the patent-based malpractice claim
raises the concerns voiced by the Merrell Dow Court:
We think it would ... undermine ... congressional intent to
conclude that the federal courts might nevertheless exercise ...
181. But cf. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
1998), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d
1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
182. See Tarleton, supra note 75, at 1400 (“The Merrell Dow Court viewed the question of
Congress’s jurisdictional intent as inseparable from the question of the significance of the
federal issue in dispute.”). 
183. Distinguish this from a case in which a federal court appropriately exercises
jurisdiction over a state law claim. Exercising jurisdiction will have limited impact because
the court’s ruling will control in other similar cases such that a federal forum will no longer
be necessary to resolve the issue. So providing a federal remedy in that case will occur in only
one case, as opposed to patent-based malpractice. 
184. Grable, 545 U.S. at 319. 
185. See infra Part IV.B.
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jurisdiction and provide remedies for violations of that federal
statute solely because the violation of the federal statute is said
to be a ... “proximate cause” under state law, rather than a
federal action under federal law.186
In dictum, the Court went on to say that a more appropriate
argument would be that federal law preempts the state law cause
of action.187 In the patent context, this argument would be unavail-
ing. The states should continue to adjudicate these claims because
the USPTO preempts state law only in rare cases,188 and patent
issues are at best relevant “only insofar as it helps [a court] to
determine who would have prevailed in that hypothetical action.”189
B. Exercising Federal Jurisdiction over These Claims Would
Contravene the Congressionally Approved Division of Labor for
Malpractice Claims
Because “the phrase ‘arising under’ masks a welter of issues
regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the
proper management of the federal judicial system,”190 a court must
conduct “sensitive judgments” concerning the effects of finding
jurisdiction over a particular claim.191 The Grable Court approached
this problem by requiring that courts make sure that exercising
jurisdiction will not tread on Congress’s intent with respect to the
federal-state division of labor.192 That analysis can be confusing,
however, because the proper home for this analysis would seem to
be the jurisdictional statute—here, § 1338(a)—but the Court in
Grable and Merrell Dow looked to the embedded statute for this
statement of intent.193 For a patent-based malpractice claim, it
makes little difference which statute the courts choose because on
186. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 (1986) (emphasis added). 
187. Id. at 816. 
188. 37 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2008) (“Nothing in this part shall be construed to preempt the
authority of each State to regulate the practice of law, except to the extent necessary for the
[USPTO] to accomplish its Federal objectives.”); see also Hricik, supra note 55, at 392. 
189. New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner, 702 N.W.2d 336, 346 (Neb. 2005). 
190. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Labs. Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
191. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810. 
192. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 319-20 (2005).
193. Tarleton, supra note 75, at 1404. 
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both fronts that statement of congressional intent is lacking. The
potential burden on the federal docket should tip the scales in favor
of remand because malpractice is a state claim and Congress was
arguably not thinking about usurping those claims when it wrote
the jurisdictional and patent statutes.
Despite the use of “exclusive” in the patent jurisdiction statute,
this grant is not automatic, for only patent cases arise under patent
law.194 The statute should not be read so broadly as to make federal
courts the sole arbiter of patent questions. At times, patent issues—
even substantial questions of patent law—must be determined in
state court.195 It is tenuous to suggest Congress believed that a
malpractice claim for failing to succeed in—or bring—a patent pros-
ecution also arose under patent laws simply by enacting § 1338(a).196
Moreover, at the time it created the Federal Circuit, Congress
indicated its desire that the Federal Circuit construe its jurisdiction
strictly and that patent cases should arise under patent law the way
they arise under federal law for § 1331 purposes.197 By expressing
a desire for jurisdictional boundaries, Congress implicitly acknowl-
edged that some cases involving patents would not fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of § 1338(a). Given that states traditionally
regulate attorney conduct,198 exercising jurisdiction over a patent-
based malpractice claim would contravene Congress’s endorsement
of strict jurisdiction for § 1338(a).
The embedded statute for patent-based malpractice claims is an
even less likely home for any statement of congressional intent.
194. Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1897).
195. See id. (distinguishing between patent cases properly in federal court and patent
questions, which should be in state court); see also New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner, 702 N.W.2d
336, 345 (Neb. 2005) (“[N]ot every dispute involving a patent arises under the patent laws
within the meaning of § 1338(a).”).
196. See Tarleton, supra note 75, at 1402 (“[T]here is no doubt that the Congress adopting
the first federal question statute did not consider the specific possibility of whether federal
question jurisdiction should lie over state law claims implicating provisions of substantive
federal laws that did not yet exist.” (citations omitted)). Notwithstanding the fact that
Tarleton is discussing § 1331, the reader should be aware of the multitude of examples
throughout this Note detailing the similarities between § 1331 and § 1338(a). For that reason,
this statement applies equally to § 1338(a) and its use of the phrase “arising under.” 
197. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 19 (1981) (characterizing the “arising under” language in
§ 1338(a) as a “substantial requirement” to quell arguments that the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction was too broad).
198. Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1167 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he law governing legal
malpractice represents a traditional exercise of state authority.”).
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Notwithstanding this private right of action for patent infringement,
Congress did not approve the division of labor for patent cases to
extend to malpractice claims. Recall that the two claims differ in an
important context: parties and remedy.199 Congress endorsed a grant
of exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent cases to further the
goals of patent law, but a case in which the defendant infringer is
not a party would not further those goals.200 The congressionally
approved division of labor for substantive patent suits, therefore,
does not extend to a malpractice action. 
In Immunocept, the court argued that Congress’s creation of the
Federal Circuit was evidence that Grable was satisfied.201 But that
is simply not the case. The Federal Circuit was created to alleviate
the nonuniformity problems throughout the federal circuits.202
Congress did not indicate any statement of intent with regard to
federal-state division of labor by setting up this court. Rather, the
creation of the Federal Circuit indicates Congress’s focus on en-
suring uniform decisions of substantive patent rights throughout
the federal court system.
Most importantly, exercising exclusive federal jurisdiction over
patent-based malpractice claims would significantly upset the
congressionally approved division of labor between federal and state
courts for patent issues. The Merrell Dow and Grable Courts were
both primarily concerned that exercising jurisdiction in a given case
might invite “a horde of original filings and removal cases raising
other state claims with embedded federal issues.”203 Indeed, the
199. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. 
200. Contra Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476,
478-79 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Here, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant had infringed his
patent in order to prevail on his business disparagement claim. Id. at 478. Because the
infringing party was a party to a lawsuit and the remedy sought was an injunction,
jurisdiction over this claim seems more defensible than a malpractice claim. In Additive
Controls, the presence of the two foregoing factors, absent in a malpractice action, furthers
the purposes of patent law and would seem to be endorsed by Congress, because it provided
a remedy to plaintiffs whose patent is infringed by another patentee. However, the remedy
in a malpractice action is not directly for the infringement but the attorney’s negligent
behavior. Id.
201. Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir.
2007). 
202. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 21-23 (1980); see also ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 19.1(b), at 1173 (8th ed. 2007).
203. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 318 (2005)
(discussing Merrell Dow and the Court’s concern in the increase in federal litigation if it
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Grable Court noted specifically that finding federal jurisdiction in
that case was not disruptive for two reasons: (1) once the disputed
and substantial issue was resolved by the Court, the holding could
be applied to other cases involving similar facts in state court;204 and
(2) given the rarity of quiet title actions raising contested issues of
federal law, exercising jurisdiction over the claim did not affect the
“normal currents of litigation.”205
Under Air Measurement, a plaintiff that is denied altogether or
loses an infringement action because of the attorney’s alleged
negligence must file her action in federal court. Unlike Grable, in
which resolution of the statute’s meaning determined the disposi-
tion of that case and future cases involving the notice statute, the
Federal Circuit did not temper the effect of its holding. The number
of filings in the short time since Air Measurement no doubt empha-
sizes this fact.206 In addition, the Supreme Court previously rejected
federal jurisdiction for state law claims that raise federal issues as
a theory of proximate causation because disruption was inevi-
table.207 Discussing Merrell Dow, the Court said, “[f]or if the federal
labeling standard without a federal cause of action could get a state
claim into federal court, so could any other federal standard without
a federal cause of action. And that would have meant a tremendous
number of cases.”208
exercised jurisdiction in a particular case).  
204. See supra Part IV.A. 
205. Grable, 545 U.S. at 319. 
206. Tomar Elecs., Inc. v. Watkins, No. 2:09-CV-00170-PHX-ROS, 2009 WL 2222707 (D.
Ariz. July 23, 2009); Weather Cent., Inc. v. Reinhart Boerner VanDeuren, SC, No. 08-CV-582-
bbc, 2009 WL 367694 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 10, 2009); Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Banner & Witcoff,
Ltd., 585 F. Supp. 2d 995 (N.D. Ill. 2008); LaBelle v. McGonagle, No. 07-12097-GAO, 2008 WL
3842998 (D. Mass. Aug. 15, 2008); Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, No. 2: 08-102-DCR,
2008 WL 3833699 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 13, 2008); Chopra v. Townsend, Townsend & Crew LLP, No.
07-cv-02447-MSK-MEH, 2008 WL 413944 (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2008). But see James H.
Anderson, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 08-CV-6202, 2009 WL 2244622 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2009)
(examining Singh, Air Measurement, and Immunocept and concluding that federal jurisiction
was not proper over a copyright-based malpractice claim). These are just the filings that have
appeared in federal court within the last year citing Air Measurement with approval on the
question of jurisdiction. Note that the Federal Circuit has recently reaffirmed its holdings in
Air Measurement and Immunnocept. Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
207. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 (1986). 
208. Grable, 545 U.S. at 318. 
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Simply stated, plaintiffs are more willing to bring patent mal-
practice claims209 and adding state law claims based on hypothetical
federal issues to the federal courts’ already burgeoning docket is
unwise.210 In addition to substantive patent suits, the federal courts
will have to adjudicate patent-based malpractice if it involves a
substantive patent issue. And even if the “disruptive portent” only
occurs for § 1338(a) claims, that portent can still reach beyond
patent cases because there are other federal issues in which the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.211 At its core, the malprac-
tice claim is about the relationship between a client and a lawyer.212
States have traditionally handled the regulation of attorney conduct
and should be allowed to do so in the future. Allowing patent-based
malpractice claims into federal court as a general rule is an un-
warranted usurpation of state authority.213
C. An Alternative Approach: Weighing the Potential for Disruption
Against the Federal Interest at Stake
The Merrell Dow Court noted that “arising under” jurisprudence
could be described in terms of the “nature of the federal interest at
stake.”214 The Court suggested by way of comparison that federal
jurisdiction extends only to those cases in which the federal interest
at stake was great enough to alter fundamentally the nature of the
plaintiff ’s claim from state tort to wholly federal.215 Because the test
in Grable is difficult to apply, one scholar has argued that a better
approach simply balances the nature of federal interest at stake
209. Oddi, supra note 18, at 3-6. 
210. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 52 tbl.S-7 (2007), available at http://www.
uscourts. gov/library/statisticalreports.html; see also 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 16, § 1:6,
at 23-30 (detailing the rise in legal malpractice litigation over the last decade).
211. See AM. LAW INST., EMPLOYMENT LAW ABA CLE, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 168-69 (2008) (discussing the ruling in Air Measurement and stating that
plaintiffs should be able to bring malpractice actions against their attorneys for employment
decisions concerning antidiscrimination or labor standards over which the federal courts also
have exclusive jurisdiction).  
212. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.  
213. See Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 339-40 (5th Cir. 2008). 
214. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986).
215. Id.
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with the potential for disruption.216 When the potential exists that
exercising jurisdiction over a claim will invite numerous state filings
to the federal docket, the federal courts should rely on state courts
to apply federal law.217 Grable should be read as cautioning courts
to consider the future effects that their jurisdictional ruling will
have rather than focusing on the case at bar. For patent-based
malpractice claims between private parties regulating attorney
conduct and not patent rights disputes, the federal interest at stake
appears weak. And the potential for disruption is high because there
is no limiting principle in the Federal Circuit’s rulings. A federal
court could hear any malpractice claim if patent infringement, claim
scope, validity, or enforceability are necessarily raised during the
causation determination. 
Read together, Merrell Dow and Grable require a significant
federal interest at stake for proper federal jurisdiction.218 In Merrell
Dow, the federal interest was relatively weak because the statute
affected private parties whose rights were delineated by the federal
statute. But the federal interest in Grable was much stronger.
There, the embedded federal statute’s meaning was controverted
and the government had a direct interest in vindicating its own
administrative action.219
The federal interest at stake in most patent-based malpractice
claims is weak. The patent-based malpractice suit regulates neg-
ligent behavior by lawyers and does not further the purposes of
patent law because the patent-infringing defendant is not a party to
the litigation.220 Like Merrell Dow, the suit is about the conduct of
private parties and imposing money judgments against parties that
act negligently. In contrast, the resolution of the federal issue raised
in Grable had a direct bearing on the federal government’s methods
216. Tarleton, supra note 75, at 1408. This test captures the essence of the Grable test
without the rigidity of the Court’s language requiring the courts to find a disputed and
substantial federal question before proceeding to analysis of Congress’s intent on jurisdiction.
217. Hoffman, supra note 100, at 298.
218. Tarleton, supra note 75, at 1408. 
219. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2005). 
220. Id. at 319 (“Given the ... clear interest the Government, its buyers, and its delinquents
have in the availability of a federal forum, there is no good reason to shirk from federal
jurisdiction over the dispositive and contested federal issue at the heart of the state-law title
claim.” (emphasis added)). Note that in Grable all the parties to the suit were involved in the
embedded federal issue—that is, the federal tax delinquency, seizure, and subsequent sale.
In a patent-based malpractice claim, this is not the case.
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for collecting taxes and raising revenue—a much stronger federal
concern.221
Whether a federal court can conclusively decide an issue also
gauges the strength of the federal interest.222 Finding federal
jurisdiction in Smith and Grable meant settling the issue finally.
There, the federal interests were strong. The federal interest in
Merrell Dow and Empire were much weaker because they rested on
fact-bound inquiries, opening the door to recurrent litigation, much
like patent-based malpractice claims. The Federal Circuit and those
who favor more expansive patent jurisdiction cite the need for
uniformity in patent law as justification and evidence of the
significant federal interest in adjudicating more patent cases.223 But
the uniformity argument can be overblown.224 Indeed, the Merrell
Dow Court expressly rejected a similar uniformity argument by the
parties.225 And it is difficult to imagine how granting jurisdiction
over a hypothetical patent infringement suit, necessary only to de-
termine causation and damages, advances patent law’s purposes.226
For example, in Air Measurement, the plaintiff had already settled
with the infringing defendants.227 What interest in patent law
uniformity does a hypothetical action over a nonexistent patent
right advance when the plaintiff has already settled with the
infringement defendants in the prior litigation?
Similarly, critics of § 1338(a) jurisdictional constraints argue that
the need for competent patent adjudication creates a substantial
221. Tarleton, supra note 75, at 1406. As Tarleton points out, Smith is another example of
the requirement that a significant federal interest be at stake. Id. at 1411-12. In that case,
the Court had to decide the constitutionality of the Federal Farm Loan Act. Smith v. Kan.
City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
222. Tarleton, supra note 75, at 1412. 
223. Mark J. Henry, State Courts Hearing Patent Cases: A Cry for Help to the Federal
Circuit, 101 DICK. L. REV. 41 (1996); Seymore, supra note 29, at 475-81.
224. But cf. Timothy E. Grimsrud, Holmes and the Erosion of Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction over Patent Claims, 87 MINN. L. REV. 2133 (2003) (arguing that compulsory
patent counterclaims should be heard in the Federal Circuit in the interests of patent
uniformity); Emmette F. Hale, III, The ‘Arising Under’ Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: An
Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229 (1986) (arguing that the
appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit should not be bound by the traditional principles
of “arising under” jurisdiction). 
225. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 (1986). 
226. New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner, 702 N.W.2d 336, 346 (Neb. 2005). 
227. Air Measurement Tech., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, 504 F.3d 1262,
1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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federal interest for federal jurisdiction over patent malpractice
claims.228 The need for competent judgments of substantive patent
suits indicates a substantial federal interest in a federal forum.229
But the argument that this extends to malpractice mischaracterizes
the claim as a patent claim and perhaps overestimates the federal
courts’ expertise in patent cases.230 Malpractice claims are about the
relationship between a lawyer and her client, not the underlying
litigation. Although state courts do not hear nearly as many patent
cases as federal judges and may be less familiar with the issues, the
claim is centrally about the attorney’s obligation to his client. And
state courts are extremely well versed in adjudicating attorney
conduct. 
Balanced against this weak interest, the high potential for dis-
ruption of the federal-state division of labor231 compels the conclu-
sion that federal jurisdiction over these claims is improper. Just as
the Court’s conclusion that it was settling the issues in Smith and
Grable was evidence that the federal interest was great, those facts
also weighed against any disruptive potential. But as discussed, the
spectre of disruption is ever present for fact-bound patent-based
malpractice claims. Indeed, more aggrieved clients are filing their
patent malpractice claims in federal, rather than state court.232 As
the Singh court observed in the context of trademark malpractice,
228. Seymore, supra note 29, at 475-76.
229. See generally HENRY J.FRIENDLY,FEDERAL JURISDICTION:A GENERAL VIEW 157 (1973)
(“I am unable to perceive why we should not insist on the same level of scientific
understanding on the patent bench that clients demand of the patent bar.”). Judge Friendly’s
argument endorses the arguments that patent scholars make today. Namely, patent cases are
increasingly complex and, therefore, the federal courts should adjudicate them because they
hear them more often. But some evidence suggests that federal district courts frequently
make mistakes in patent cases and do not seem to be learning from them. See infra note 231
and accompanying text. And the Court has never allowed this competency/uniformity
argument to determine the scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction. For example, if not raised
in the well-pleaded complaint, patent issues will be heard in state court if the rest of the
claims are state claims. Because any federal issue would likely benefit from uniform federal
court judgments, overreliance on the uniformity argument leads to ludicrous jurisdictional
results. Tarleton, supra note 75, at 1406.   
230. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008) (concluding that
while the reversal rates for claim construction rulings have been constant, federal district
judges do not seem to improve with experience adjudicating patent matters). 
231. See supra Part IV.B.
232. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
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this claim “for federal [question] jurisdiction reaches so broadly that
it would sweep innumerable state law malpractice claims into
federal court.”233 Balancing the weak federal interest at stake and
the many filings post-Air Measurement, the conclusion is clear:
patent-based malpractice claims do not belong in a federal forum.
Federal courts faced with this question should heed the federalism
concerns ingrained in federal question jurisprudence and remand
these claims to state court for adjudication. 
CONCLUSION
At the outset of the Grable opinion the Court tempered any
attempt to expand unnecessarily federal jurisdiction because
exercising federal jurisdiction over a state claim “calls for a
‘common-sense accommodation of judgment to the kaleidoscopic
situations’ that present a federal issue, in ‘a selective process which
picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones
aside.’”234 In other words, not every case requiring resolution of a
federal issue will be litigated in federal court. There are simply too
many cases and too many issues. When the federal interest is weak,
the federal government must rely on the states to apply federal law
in state law claims.235
Admittedly, patent law and § 1338(a) present several unique
considerations. But the Court has not altered its jurisdictional
requirements or inquiries simply because federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over patent claims. Like other federal issues,
patents will come up in a variety of causes of action other than a
substantive patent suit. Surely, this is where common sense
judgments must come into play. While being mindful of the future
effects, the federal courts should be reticent to rely on exclusive
jurisdiction and the need to adjudicate a hypothetical infringement
233. Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 2008). Although patent- and
trademark-based malpractice are somewhat distinguishable, see 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006),
the point is still relevant to the issue of the number of patent-based filings post-Air
Measurement and Immunocept.
234. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 304, 313 (2005)
(quoting Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936)).
235. See Hoffman, supra note 100, at 298; Tarleton, supra note 75, at 1408. 
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action as dispositive of the jurisdictional question for patent-based
malpractice claims.
Malpractice is about the client and attorney relationship, not the
infringed patent. Patent rights are simply the vehicle for analysis.
Ultimately, § 1338(a) gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over substantive patent suits and perhaps even more leeway to
decide which substantive patent questions in state law claims “arise
under” the patent law. But a hypothetical case determining a
patent’s hypothetical validity or infringement is not a substantive
patent suit, nor does it further the goals of patent law. When only
these hypothetical rights are at issue, federal courts should view
these claims with more skepticism.
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